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pRISON OVERCROWDING IN NEBRASKA: 
fIlE FEASIBILITY OF INTENSIVE 
SUPERVISION PROBATION 
--
DennL'l Hoffman 
Vincent 1 Webb 
This chapter anal}'7.e8 the magnitude and causes of Nebraska's prison overcrowding 
problem. Nebraska's response to this problem has been to expand prison capacity and 
to implement programs to decrease length of stay. Another policy option - reducing 
prison admissions through intensive supervision probation - is examined in this 
chapter. Data from Nebraska Parole Board files indicate there is a category of current 
prison inmates that are not sufficiently dangerous to require imprisonment. Many of 
these nonviolent offenders with marginal criminal histories could be diverted into 
intensive probation programs that are more cost·effective than incarceration. 
Introduction 
1 
Prison populations in the United States are higher than ever before and 
growing fast. During the 1978-85 period, state prison populations increased 
from 270,025 to 463,378 inmates. Expenditures by state correctional systems 
exceeded $8 billion in 1985 (Zedlewski 1987). 
At present, inmate populations exceed cell capacities in almost all states. 
As of February 1986, forty-six states and U.S. territories either were under 
court order or were involved in litigation concerning prison conditions that 
could result in court orders (American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
1986). Conditions related to overcrowding are central to a majority of these 
suits. 
Some state prisons, such as New York's Sing Sing Prison, have been the 
sites of overcrowding-related disturbances in the 1980s (Kurlander 1983). In 
fact, a frequent argument against overcrowding is that it leads to prison riots. 
Nebraska is one of the few lucky states. Even though its prisons are filled 
beyond capacity, there have been no court orders or inmate riots yet. 
Correctional policymakers in Nebraska still have the opportunity to take a 
proactive approach in regulating the prison population before it gets out of 
control. 
The authors would like to acknowledge the help of Frank Gunter, Chuck Comwel~ Ron Baltee, 
Nikki Reisen, Robm Keller, Stacey Oakes, and Tracy Anderson. 
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Many strategies for alleviating overcrowding are available to Nebraska 
policymakers. The traditional response to prison overcrowding has been the 
construction of additional prison capacity (Blumstein 1983). Other strategies 
have been devised to regulate the flow of admissions to prison or to contrOl 
the length of time served. Strategies for controlling prison admissions 
include revising sentencing law and practice (for example, changing 
sentencing guidelines), developing alternative sanctions, and using private 
prisons. Strategies for regulating time served range from efforts to speed up 
the parole process to attempts to improve classification and expand 
prerelease programming (Mullen 1987). 
Correctional policymakers in Nebraska still have the 
opportunity to take a proactive approach in regulating 
the prison population before it gets out of control. 
This chapter analyzes the feasibility of Intensive Supervision Probation 
(ISP) as an alternative sanction. ISP is an intermediate form of punishment 
that permits certain offenders to serve their prison sentences in the 
community rather than in prison. 
The focus is on ISP for two reasons. First, ISP promises to "get as many 
people out of prison and off taxpayers' backs as possible" (Conrad 1986,83). 
For Nebraska- a state with a limited population base and limited resources 
- ISP is a potentially useful austerity measure. Second, dependable informa-
tion is available on the cost-effectiveness ofISP. As yet, knowledge is sketchy 
and incomplete about other alternatives to prison that have been developed 
in the 1980s. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the Nebraska prison overcrowd-
ing situation. Next, Nebraska's short-term prison population is described in 
order to determine whether Nebraska has a sufficient number of nonviolent 
offenders who could be placed in ISP without jeopardizing public safety. 
Following this needs assessment, the cost-effectiveness and political 
acceptability of ISP are examined. The chapter concludes with a summary of 
the major findings and1 a discussion of policy actions that Nebraska 
policymakers might take. 
Prison Overcrowding in Nebraska 
Nebraska's state prisons face an overcrowding problem. Understanding 
the magnitude of the problem, its causes, and the state correctional ~gencies' 
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response to the problem is a necessary prelude to charting a course to solve 
the problem. 
prison Population Increases 
Nebraska's prison population has soared since 1979. In November 1979, 
there were 1,256 inmates in Nebraska Department of Correctional Services 
(DeS) penal facilities (DCS 1986a). By June 30, 1988, the state prison 
population had risen to 2,077 (DCS 1988). This represents nearly a doubling 
of prison inmates in less than ten years (figure 1). 
Figure 1 - Nebraska Prison Population, 1979-89 
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Several factors are responsible for the increases in Nebraska's prison 
population. 
• Increasing Admissions. From 1980 to 1986 Nebraska experienCed a 
39.2 percent increase in the number of persons given prison sentences 
of one or more years (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1987). The 974 total 
admissions in 1987 represented an all time high for the Nebraska 
penal system (Des 1987b). 
• Increasing Probability of Imprisonment. Between 1980 and 1985, the 
ratio of prison commitments to reported crimes in Nebraska 
increased from 35 to 39 state prison admissions per 1,000 serious 
offenses (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1987). 
• Rising Commitments for Drug Offenses, First Degree Sexual Assault, 
and Second Degree Forgery. From 19782 to 1987, \4e percentage of 
prison commitments for all drug offenses increased from 5.8 percent 
to 14.6 percent; the percentage of commitments for first degree sexual 
assault increased from 3.0 percent to 9.3 percent; and the percentage 
of commitments for second degree forgery increased from 0.8 percent 
to 5.5 percent (Des 1987b). Considering the federal government's 
recent allocation of nearly $1.5 million to criminal justice agencies in 
Nebraska for the enforcement of state and local drug laws (Nebraska 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 1987),3 com· 
mitments for drug offenses can be expected to continue to increase 
over the next few years. 
• Increasing Lengths of Stay in Prison. The median 4 length of stay in ' 
Nebraska's prisons has steadily increased from 13 months in 1982 to 
15 months in 1983, 19 months in 1984, and 20 months in 1985 and 
1986 (Des 1986a). 5 
• Declining Parole Rates. Between 1969 and 1983, parole rates (tht 
percentage of hearings granted that resulted in paroles) in Nebraska 
were never lower than seventy percent. From 1984 to 1986, however,' 
the parole rates of 63.98, 58.19, and 63.78 were substantially lower' 
than the parole rates in previous years (Nebraska Parole Bow' 
1969_86).6 
Based on the assumption that criminal justice policy variables such ai' 
these will continue to influence prison popUlation levels, DCS is currentIJ 
projecting a year-end population of 2,541 inmates by 1989 (DCS 1986a: 
Des also acknowledges that the population at the highest risk of imprisol 
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ment (males between th~ ages of 18 and 39) is expected to remain stable in 
Nebraska through 1990. 
prison Overcrowding 
Nebraska's prison population is increasing, but are its prisons really over-
crowded? Ont way of measuring prison overcrowding is to compare the 
rated capacity of an institution to its actual population. Table 1 indicates 
that when rated capacity is used as a yardstick, Nebraska's prisons vary in 
overcrowdedness. The Nebraska State Penitentiary and the Lincoln Correc-
tional Center are the most crowded DCS facilities. The Nebraska State 
Penitentiary is5~,:?_percent over capacity, while the Lincoln Correctional 
Center is 44.2 percent over capacity. The Omaha Correctional Center, at 
22.1 percent over capacity, and the Nebraska Center for Women, at 10.7 
percent over capacity, are much less crowded. 
The Nebraska State Penitentiary 
has seventy percent of the inmates housed 
in less than sixty square feet per cell; 
the Lincoln Correctional Center has sixty percent 
of the inmates living in less than sixty square feet each . ... 
Another way of measuring overcrowding is to examine spatial density. 
Most standard-setting bodies, such as the American Correctional Associa-
tion, require sixty square feet of living space for each inmate, which is 
roughly the size of a bathroom in an American home. To figure the percent-
age of inmates housed in sixty square feet or less in Nebraska's prisons, the 
following method was used: (1) DCS data were obtained indicating the 
average cell size is seventy-five square feet at the Nebraska State Peniten-
tiary, seventy square feet at the Lincoln Correctional Center, and eighty-
three square feet at the Omaha Correctional Center (DeS 1987c); (2) it was 
assumed that every inmate classified as a bed deficit (that is, being without 
his or her own cell) must share a cell with another inmate who is not 
classified as a bed deficit; (3) the bed deficit for each facility was multiplied by 
two to get the number of inmates sharing a space designed for single 
occupancy; and (4) that number was then divided by the total population of a 
. facility to get the percentage of inmates living in sixty square feet or less. 
This method shows that the Nebraska State Penitentiary has seventy 
percent of its inmates housed in less than sixty square feet per cell; the 
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Table 1 - Rated Capacities, Current Populations, and Bed Deficits of Nebraska's Prisons 
on February 17,1987 
Percem-
Rated Actual Bed over 
Facility Capacity Population Deficit Capa~ 
Nebraska State Penitentiary 
Inside NSP Facility 338 525 187 55.3 
Trusty Dormitory 150 154 4 2.7 
Lincoln Correctional Center 468 675 205 44.2 
Omaha Correctional Center 240 293 53 22.1 
Nebraska Center for Women 84 93 9 10.7 
Source: Department of Correctional Services. 
Lincoln Correctional Center has sixty percent of its inmates living in less 
than sixty square feet each; and the Omaha Correctional Center !1aS thirty. 
six percent of its inmates housed in less than sixty square feet each. 
Corollaries of Crowding 
Nebraska's prison overcrowding-related problems mirror the problems 
encountered by most states' prisons. First, the number of prisoners inside 
Nebraska's prisons places severe pressure upon the staff, support services, 
and financial resources of Des. While the prison population has risen 
rapidly, there has not been a concomitant increase in facility staff to manage 
inmates (Des 1986a). Generally, resources are becoming insufficient to 
meet the basic needs of inmates and the prison system (Des 1986a). 
Second, the potential for inmate violence in Nebraska's prisons may be 
increasing. The most comprehensive research on the linkage between prison 
overcrowding and inmate violence (Gaes and McGuire 1984)10 concluded 
that "overcrowding ... is the best predictor of assault rates," and that 
housing large numbers of inmates in dormitories (common areas) is related 
to higher levels of assault. At the Nebraska State Penitentiary about 150, 
inmates are housed in a dormitory (table 1), thus heightening the chances for 
inmate violence there. 
Third, overcrowding adversely affects programming. Due to budget. 
cutbacks, programming for inmates has been decreased rather than 
increased, even though the prison population continues to rise (DeS 1986b).! 
Parole board members blame overcrowding for a shortage of opportunities 
for inmates to participate in work and rehabilitation programs (Alvarez and! 
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Wieseman 1987). Des officials blame overcrowding as the cause of increased 
idleness and overclassification (for example, placing inmates in higher 
security levels than the inmates' behavior and background require) (Tewes 
1987). 
Fourth, prisoner litigation relating to crowded conditions is mounting, 
along with concern among correctional officials about the likelihood of a 
court order (Gunter 1987a). According to the Des director, other states 
faced with similar overcrowding-related problems have been placed under 
court order (Gunter 1987b). Such litigation imposes costs on the state 
because these lawsuits require the resources of the state attorney general 
office as well as the court system. 
Nebraska's Response 
Nebraska's response to prison overcrowding has been to expand prison 
capacity and to create programs to reduce length of stay in prison. 
f\:Prison Expansion. For the most part, Des has been trying to build its 
Way out of the problem of prison overcrowding. It constructed the Omaha 
Correctional Center in 1984 to house 240 medium- and minimum-security 
inmates (Des 1984-85). It also converted a vacant building on the Hastings 
Regional Center campus into a 160-bed, minimum-security prison in 1987. 
Des has been trying to build its way 
out of the problem of prison overcrowding. 
Future Des plans include building a ISO-bed, minimum-security area 
within the compound of the Omaha Correctional Center and constructing a 
new ISO-bed, minimum-security unit near the old reformatory in Lincoln 
(DCS 1986c). At completion (projected for the summer of 1990), system 
capacity is expected to be 1,959 male and female beds. Assuming the DeS 
projection of 2,541 inmates in 1990 is accurate, the population would still be 
thirty percent over design capacity after construction was finished (Des 
19800). 
The Price of Prison. The price of prison is high. Construction of the 
Omaha Correctional Center cost over $18 million. Of this amount, $500,000 
was paid to acquire a site for the facility in Omaha and $1.5 million was 
expended to prepare the site for construction (Falconer 1988). The remain-
ing $16 million was used for actual construction costs. 
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To cover the costs of future prison expansion for 1987-90, Des made a 
special request to the Nebraska Legislature in December 1986 for nearly $l3. 
million in additional funding to accommodate estimated prison overpopu_ 
lation through 1990 (Des 1986a). Included in this Des proposal were funds 
for the construction and operation of three new penal facilities. Initial 
construction was estimated to cost $562,700 for the Hastings RegiOnal 
Center, $1,401,800 for the new unit at the Omaha Correctional Center, and 
$1,973,790 for the new unit at the Lincoln Correctional Center (Des 
1986a).11 Extra funds were also included to meet the costs resulting from 
underestimated and unbudgeted increases in the prison population each 
year. 
Building prisons is only part of the cost. Additional costs are paid every 
year through the operating budget - what it costs to run the prisons. 
Estimated future annual operating costs are $1,088,781 for the Hastings 
Regional Center, $755,429 for the new addition at the Omaha Correctional 
Center, and $1,120,080 for the addition at the Lincoln Correctional Center 
(DCS 1986a). 
Current annual operating costs, including indirect costs such as Des 
admini.,trative expenses and per capita costs for Nebraska's prisons, are 
shown in table 2. A useful way of looking at this expenditure data is to think 
of the costs of an individual sentence. As table 2 indicates, one year of actual 
time served at the Nebraska State Penitentiary represents a commitment of 
$17,045 of the taxpayers' money. In effect, a sentence of one year or ten 
years says that offender and that crime are worth resources totaling $17,045 
or $170,450. 
Table 2 - Annual Operating and Per Capita Costs for Nebraska's Prisons, FY 1986-87' 
Annual Per Capita 
Facility Operating Cost Cost 
Nebraska State Penitentiary $11,587,349 $17,045 
Lincoln Correctional Center 
and Evaluation Unit $9,891,289 $14,803 
Omaha Correctional Center $4,088,710 $13,983 
Nebraska Center For Women $1,847,231 $21,331 
'Table includes neither the costs of the community corrections centers in Omaha and Lince 
nor the costs of the Hastings Regional Center. 
Source: Department of Correctional Services. 
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Besides operating costs, there are also incalculable - but real- oppor-
tunity costs associated with prison expansion. These should be considered as 
lost opportunity costs, because funds devoted to prisons are unavailable for 
other public purposes, such as education, health, and economic develop-
ment. 
Return on Investment. What do Nebraskans receive for these large out-
lays of money? Possible benefits of incarceration include: 
• Incapacitation, or the prevention of crimes because the offender is in 
prison; 
• Specific deterrence, or the prevention of crimes because punishment 
dissuades the punished from repeating crimes; 
• Reduced recidivism because inmates are rehabilitated; and 
• General deterrence, or prevention of crimes by would-be offenders 
who are deterred because offenders are punished (Funke 1985). 
The few studies that have priced the benefits of incapacitation and 
reduced recidivism indicate that prisons do not provide enough of these 
kinds of benefits to justify them by cost alone (Funke 1985). One study, for 
example, examined the incapacitation benefits of a typical federal correc-
tional institution and concluded that the monetary value of avoided crimes 
was less than the costs of incarceration (McGuire 1978). 
The few studies that have priced the benefits 
of incapacitation and reduced recidivism 
indicate that prisons do not provide 
enough of these kinds of benefits to 
justify them by cost alone. 
Despite the many public discussions and political debates that have 
concluded with certainty that prisons deter crime and therefore sentences 
ought to be longer, there is little evidence to support the notion that 
deterrence is a major benefit of prison. A review of more than twenty 
analyses directed at testing whether or not the use of noncapital sanctions 
deters crime cautioned that the evidence "is still not sufficient for providing a 
rigorous confirmation of the existence of a deterrent effect." (Nagin 1978) 
Regarding the incapacitation effects of prison, a distinction must be 
drawn between schemes iIlvolving collective incapacitation and those using 
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selective incapacitation. Under collective incapacitation, standardized 
sentences would be developed on the basis of data on rates of recidivism 
associated with various crimes. Under selective incapacitation, individualized 
sentences would be given based on predictions about the likelihood that 
specific offenders would commit serious offenses at a high rate if not locked 
up. A leading expert on the usefulness of incapacitating criminals reviewed 
the research findings on incapacitation and concluded that: 
Collective incapacitation policies have only modest impacts on crime but can cause 
enormous increases in prison populations. Selective incapacitation strategies offer the 
possibility of achieving greater reductions in crime at considerably smaller costs in 
prison resources, but their success depends critically on the ability to identify high- rate 
offenders early in their careers or prospectively. As yet, this has not been accomplished 
(Cohen 1983,5). 
Regarding rehabilitation as a benefit of prison, study after study has 
shown that rehabilitative programs have promised much but delivered very 
little in terms of transforming criminals into law-abiding citizens (Bailey 
1966; Morris 1974; Lerman 1975; Lipton and others 1975; Riedel and 
Thornberry 1978). Even if rehabilitation were a proven benefit of prison, 
this alone would be a weak justification for incarceration, because the prime 
objective of prisons in the United States is control, not changing the 
lawbreaker. 
More powerful rationales for prisons stem from noneconomic premises 
that have little to do with either money or recidivism. It is almost certain that 
there are crimes that can not be priced, such as murder, rape and robbery; 
and prison can playa useful role in assuring that persons who commit these 
types of crimes are punished. Also, most people would agree that some 
offenders are so dangerous they must be locked up, and prison can play an 
important role in incapacitating these offenders. Additionally, there are 
persistent criminals who do not respond to probation, parole, or other forms I 
of community corrections, and prison can provide the restrictive controls 
that these offenders require (Conrad 1985). 
If imprisonment in Nebraska were limited to violent, dangerous, and I 
repeat offenders, the state would not have a prison overcrowding problem I' , 
But, as the present study will show, there are many nonviolent offenders who , 
are serving time for property crimes in Nebraska's prisons. Some of these 
offenders could be out of prison under supervision, working and paying , 
taxes, rather than occupying expensive prison cells. ' 
Alternatives to Prison. Reversing the trend toward ever more prisons aq 
prisoners will require a coordinated effort by Nebraska's criminal justiqj 
agencies. DeS and the Nebraska Parole Board have begun to chart a coUl'Slj , 
that may keep the state from making a headlong rush into a costly future! ' 
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They are joiIWy sponsoring two innovative programs: extended leave and 
hOuse parole. 
Extended Leave. Extended leave allows selected inmates at community 
corrections centers who have been set for a parole release date to live at 
home, with their families, for a limited tiIneprior to their scheduled parole 
releases or discharges from their sentences. Only those inmates who have 
successfully participated in a work or educational release program, who have 
a stable residence in the community, and who do not pose a danger to the 
community, are eligible to apply for extended leave (Des 1986b). 
While inmates are in the community on extended leave, they are under 
the intensive supervision of Adult Parole Administration field officers (Des 
1986b). Inmates must remain at their homes at all tiInes except while at 
work, school, or other approved activities. Each inmate has one face-to-face 
contact per week, either at horne or on the job, with a parole officer; two 
employment contacts per week with a parole officer; and two telephone 
contacts per week at horne with a Community Corrections Center staff 
person (Des 1986b). 
If imprisonment in Nebraska were limited to violent, 
dangerous, and repeat offenders, the state would not have 
a prison overcrowding problem. But there are many 
nonviolent offenders who are serving time for 
property crimes in Nebraska's prisons. 
Supervising an offender on extended leave costs about the same as 
supervising a parolee (about $2,133 in 1986-87), and it is cheaper than hous-
ing an inmate at the Community Corrections Centers ($7,871 in 1985-86) 
(Cornwell 1988). Another benefit is that inmates on extended leave have 
many resources available (for example, mental health and substance abuse 
counseling, family and marital counseling, educational and vocational train-
ing, and so forth) that may not be available in prison due to overcrowding 
(DCS 1986b). 
One hundred two inmates participated in the extended leave program 
from December 1986 through January 1988. As of February 1, 1988, forty-
three of these prisoners had been placed on parole, two had been discharged, 
three had been removed for technical violations, and the rest (fifty-four) 
were still on extended leave (Cornwell 1988). 
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House Parole. House parole is Nebraska's other early release progratn. 
House parole is a method of releasing into the community all prisoners who 
are near the end of their sentences and who have been paroled but do not 
have employment. The main purpose of house parole is to provide offenders 
with direct access to employment opportunities. 
House parole was begun in January 1986 to remedy a "catch-22" problem 
(Cornwell 1988): The Nebraska Parole Board refused to parole inmates into 
the community unless they had jobs, yet many inmates found it difficult to 
line up jobs while still in prison. As a result, there was a logjam in the parole 
process, with many parole-eligible inmates remaining in prison because their 
paroles were pending or they were awaiting employment. 
Many inmates with approved residences are placed on house parole in 
order to find jobs. Parolees on house parole must seek a job from 8:00 am. 
until 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. They must be at their approved 
residences from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., Monday through Friday, and aU 
weekend (Nebraska Adult Parole Administration 1986). House parolees 
who find jobs are placed on regular parole status, while those who fail to find 
jobs after 30 days may be returned to prison. 
Parolees on house parole are under the supervision of parole officers. 
Each parolee must submit a daily list of the places that will be contacted for 
employment. The parole officer uses the list to make random checks with 
prospective employers to ensure that the parolees are where they are 
supposed to be (Nebraska Adult Parole Administration 1986). 
The success of house parole could be measured in tenns of how many 
offenders find jobs, how many offenders commit crimes while in the 
community, and how much cheaper house parole is than prison. So far, no 
inmates placed on house parole have committed serious crimes while in the 
community (Cornwell 1988). It is impossible, however, to make any other 
statements about the success or failure of house parole because neither the 
Parole Board nor the Adult Parole Administration keeps statistics on wha 
happens to inmates assigned to the program. 
Nebraska's Short-Term Prison Population 
Building upon the idea that prison overcrowding can be reduced 1» 
offering safe and economical alternatives to incarceration, this section gives 
a description of the short-term prison population in Nebraska. It addresses 
the question of whether there is a sufficient number of nonviolent offenders 
in Nebraska's prisons to justify creating ISP programs in Nebraska. Case ftle 
of the Nebraska Parole Board were used to obtain data on the short-tern 
prison population. 
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Identifying the Most Likely Candidates for ISP 
The focus is on those prisoners who have minimum terms of two years or 
less, because it is assumed that those with shorter sentences have committed 
lesS serious crimes and are better risks for release into the community on 
ISP. There were 688 men and 86 women sentenced to two years or less in 
Nebraska's prisons from January 1, 1987 through January 1, 1988 (Nebraska 
Parole Board 1987). 
Certain categories of offenders were excluded from consideration as 
candidates for ISP because of factors in their criminal histories. Offenders 
admitted to prison in 1987 because of parole violations were excluded 
because it was doubtful that these offenders would be placed in community 
alternatives. Offenders who had served prior prison sentences, who had one 
or more prior felony convictions, or whose current offense was a violent 
crime, such as murder, sexual assault, or robbery, were excluded for the same 
reason. Using these exclusionary criteria, there was a remainder of 281 non-
violent offenders with zero prior felony convictions, hereafter referred to as 
NVOZs. 
NVOZs do not have to go to prison in Nebraska. All NVOZs are eligible 
for probation. In theory, it should be easy for many of them to exit the route 
to prison. Nevertheless, Nebraska's judges sent 281 NVOZs to prison in 
1987. 
Demographic and Social Characteristics of NVOZs 
Table 3 gives social and demographic information on NVOZs sentenced 
to minimum prison terms of two years or less. Three-fourths were between 
17 and 30 years old. About eighty percent of the NVOZs were unmarried, 
yet over forty percent had children. Approximately three-fourths of the 
offenders had completed some high school. At the time of the current 
offense, about one-third of the NVOZs had jobs. 
Over seventy percent of the NVOZs had past involvement in drug use 
and over eighty percent had used alcohol Data on past successes and failures 
NVOZs do not have to go to prison in Nebraska. 
All NVOZs are eligible for probation and, in theory, 
it should be easy for many of them to exit the route 
to prison. Nevertheless, Nebraska'sjudges 
sent 281 NVOZs to prison in 1987. 
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Table 3 - Social and Demographic Characteristics of Nebraska's NVOb, 1987 
Characteristic Number· Percent· -
-Sex 
Male 235 83.6 
Female 46 16.4 
Race 
White 219 77.9 
Minority 62 22.1 
Age 
17-21 90 32.0 
22-30 129 45.9 
31-40 40 14.3 
41+ 22 7.8 
Marital status 
Married 53 18.9 
Single 173 61.6 
Divorced/separated or widowed 54 19.2 
Have children 
Yes 122 43.4 
No 159 56.6 
Education 
Grade school 16 5.7 
Some high school 108 38.4 
High school or GED 101 35.9 
Some college 55 19.6 
Employed at time of arrest 
Yes 98 34.9 
No 182 64.8 
Known drug use 
Yes 207 73.7 
No 74 26.3 
Known alcohol use 
Yes 242 86.1 
No 39 13.9 
Known mental health history 
Yes 48 17.0 
No 232 82.6 
·Total numbers and percentages may vary among subcategories due to incomplete files. 
Source: Nebraska Parole Board. 
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in drug and alcohol programs and on the drug dependence of individual 
offenders were not collected. Therefore, the meaning and policy implications 
of data on drug and alcohol use are unclear. 
current Offenses of NVOZs 
Table 4 presents the offenses for which NVOZ<; were sentenced to 
prison. Over half of the offenses committed by NVOZ<; were within the 
general categories of property and burglary, and over one-fourth of the 
offenses were in the general category of drugs. Burglary, theft, second-degree 
forgery, and possession of a controlled substance were the crimes with the 
highest percentages of NVOZ<;. 
Table 4 - Types and Descriptions of Current Offenses of Nebraska's NVOZs, 1987 
Number Percent 
Property 
Theft 49 17.4 
Second degree forgery 28 10.0 
Receiving stolen property 10 3.6 
Petty larceny 4 1.4 
First degree forgery 3 1.1 
Bad check $300-$999 3 1.1 
Criminal trespassing 3 1.1 
Second degree arson 2 .7 
possession of a forged instrument $300 + 2 .7 
Bad check $1,000 + 2 .7 
Unlawful sale of mortgaged property 2 .7 
Shoplifting third offense 2 .7 
Third degree arson 1 .4 
Bad check $75-$299 1 .4 
Writing a check on nonexistent account 1 .4 
Drugs 
Possession of a controlled substance 24 8.5 
Delivery of a dangerous substance 20 7.1 
Dealing drugs 17 6.0 
Manufacturing a controlled substance 4 1.4 
Possession of over one pound of marijuana 3 1.1 
Burglary 62 22.1 
-continued 
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Table 4 continued - Types and Descriptions of Current Offenses of Nebraska's NVOZs, 1987 
---Number Percent 
-Other 
Driving under a suspended license 9 3.2 
Escape 6 2.1 
Accessory to a felony 3 1.1 
Aiding in a felony 3 1.1 
Resisting arrest 2 .7 
Conspiracy 2 .7 
Criminal mischief 2 .7 
Criminal nonsupport 1 .4 
Obstructing police 1 .4 
Operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest 1 .4 
False reporting 1 .4 
Failure to appear 1 .4 
Possession of a concealed weapon 1 .4 
Driving while intoxicated third offense 1 .4 
Abandoning a dead body 1 .4 
Unauthorized operation of a propelled vehicle 1 .4 
Possessing a short shotgun 1 .4 
Criminal attempt 1 .4 
Total 281 100.0 
Source: Nebraska Parole Board. 
Legal Processing and Sentencing Information on NVOZs 
Legal processing and sentencing information on Nebraska's NVOb is 
shown in table 5. More than three-fourths of the NVOZs were committed to 
prison for only one count. Nearly seventy percent had minimum sentences of 
less than twelve months, while over sixty percent had maximum terms of 
twenty-four months or less. Also, almost twenty percent of the NVOZs were 
discharged from prison in the same year that they were sentenced to go 
there. (It is easy to understand why Nebraska penal authorities refer to 
NVOZs as "quick dippers.") 
Table 5 also indicates that over forty percent of the NVOZs were 
sentenced from Douglas and Lancaster counties. These figures suggest that I 
there are sufficient numbers of NVOZs in Nebraska's metropolitan areas to 
justify the creation of ISP programs in Omaha and Lincoln. 
prison Overcrowding in Nebraska 
Table 5 - Legal Processing and Sentencing Information of Nebraska's NVOZs, 1987 
---
--Number of counts on current conviction 
1 
2 
3 
4 
7 
Minimum sentence 
12 months or under 
13-18 months 
19-24 months 
Maximum sentence 
24 months and under 
25-48 months 
49-60 months 
61-120 months 
Discharged in 1987 
Yes 
No 
Number of NVOZs sentenced to prison from 
Douglas, Lancaster, and all other counties 
Douglas 
Lancaster 
All other counties 
Source: Nebraska Parole Board. 
Criminal Histories of NVOZs 
Number 
219 
54 
6 
1 
1 
193 
34 
54 
172 
84 
24 
1 
54 
227 
93 
32 
156 
Percent 
77.9 
19.2 
2.1 
.4 
.4 
68.3 
12.1 
19.2 
61.2 
29.9 
8.5 
.4 
19.2 
SO.8 
33.1 
11.4 
55.5 
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Table 6 gives information on the criminal histories of NVOZs. Overall, it 
appears that NVOZs have limited criminal histories. The following facts 
stand out: 
1. Nearly one-half of the NVOZs had never been previously arrested for 
a felony and over ninety percent had three or fewer felony arrests. 
2. More than seventy percent had no prior arrests for violent crimes. 
3. Although sixty percent of the NVOZs had served time in jail, most of 
these jail terms were for traffic violations. 
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Table 6 - Criminal Histories of Nebraska's NVOb, 1987 
Number of prior felony arrests 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
13 
15 
32 
Number of prior (felony and misdemeanor) 
arrests for violent crimes 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
8 
Number of prior adult jail terms for crimes 
and traffic infractions§ 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8+ 
Number of prior adult probation orders 
o 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7+ 
Number' 
138 
56 
40 
24 
7 
4 
2 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
199 
41 
25 
9 
3 
3 
1 
111 
57 
38 
23 
9 
8 
8 
6 
21 
149 
87 
29 
12 
1 
2 
1 
Hoffman and Webb 
--Percent' 
49.1 
19.9 
14.2 
8.5 
2.5 
1.4 
.7 
1.4 
1.1 
.4 
.4 
.4 
70.8 
14.6 
8.9 
3.2 
1.1 
1.1 
.4 
39.5 
20.3 
13.5 
8.2 
3.2 
2.8 
2.8 
2.1 
8.3 
53.0 
31.0 
10.3 
4.3 
.4 
.7 
.4 
-
-continued 
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Table 6 continued - Criminal Histories of Nebraska's NVOZs, 1987 
Number· 
--prior community ~anctions (for ~mple~ fines and 
restitution) for cnmes and traffic mfractJons 
yes 
No 
probation at time of offense 
yes 
No 
Charges pending at time of arrest 
Yes 
No 
Warrants or detainers at time of arrest 
Yes 
No 
Number of prior juvenile commitments 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
'Total numbers and percentages may vary due to incomplete files. 
219 
50 
26 
255 
47 
230 
28 
229 
221 
34 
22 
2 
1 
Percent· 
77.9 
17.8 
9.3 
90.7 
16.7 
81.9 
10.0 
81.5 
78.6 
12.1 
7.8 
.7 
.4 
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\ Some NVOZs had multiple jail terms for traffic violations such as failing to have a driver's 
license, improperly displaying license plates, lacking proof of automobile ownership, running a 
stop sign, failing to yield, having no headlight, driving on the left side of the road, and driving 
while intoxicated. 
Source: Nebraska Parole Board. 
4. Over one-half of the NVOZs had never even been on adult proba-
tion, and ninety percent of them were not on probation at the time of 
arrest. 
5. Approximately eighty percent of the offenders had no prior commit-
ments to juvenile correctional institutions. 
6. Over eighty percent of the offenders had no pending charges, 
warrants, or detainers at the time of arrest. 
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7. Most of the NVOZs (77.9 percent) had prior community sancti 
against them, but many of the fines that were included in this categons 
were for traffic violations. 0ry 
---Because of the high cost of imprisonment 
and its minimal benefits for NVOZs, 
Nebraska taxpayers may be the ones who suffer 
when offenders are sentenced to a "quick dip" in prison. 
-------------------------------------------------------
From the information on the criminal histories of NVOZs, it is apparent 
that many of them could be candidates for ISP. Only a few of the NVOlJ 
(such as the offenders with numerous prior felony arrests in table 6) wOuld 
not qualify for ISP. Even after excluding the exceptional cases, there would 
still be a large pool of NVOZs eligible for alternatives to prison. 
Benefits and Costs of Short Prison Terms for NVOZs 
Most of the NVOZs sentenced to prison in Nebraska are sentenced for 
retribution or punishment, protection, and deterrence. However, prison 
sentences for NVOZs may foster criminality rather than deter it, as prisons 
have been described as "training grounds" for neophyte criminals. Also, com. 
munity protection is difficult to achieve because it is limited to the brief 
period that NVOZs are incarcerated. 
Punishment is achieved by imprisoning NVOZs, but at what cost? From 
a fiscal standpoint, imprisoning NVOZs is undesirable. Maintaining the 281 
NVq~ sentenced to prison in 1987 costs approximately $4 million per 
year. 
Because of the high cost of imprisonment and its minimal benefits for 
NVOZs, Nebraska taxpayers may be the ones who suffer when offenders arc 
sentenced to a "quick dip" in prison. The next section examines a reasonab~ 
priced alternative to prison for NVOZs that both punishes criminals and 
protects the community. 
ISP: A Viable Alternative for NVOZs in Nebraska 
ISPs have been called "prisons without walls" (New Jersey Administra~ 
Office of the Courts 1988). They feature rigorous supervision of offendeJS, 
surveillance, curfews, drug testing, mandatory employment and commUllity 
service, and strict rule enforcement. ISPs may include additional featlJlCl 
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such as restitution, fines, house arrest, and electronIc monitoring 
(Burkhardt 1986). 
Nebraska policymakers considering using ISP to alleviate prison over-
crowding need to consider the following basic questions: 
1. How are program participants selected? 
2. How are program participants supervised? 
3. How well does ISP protect the community? 
4. How cost-effective is ISP? 
5. How effective is ISP in reducing the prison population? 
6. What are the additional benefits of ISP? 
7. How politically acceptable is ISP? 
8. How practical are supervision fees as a way of funding ISP? 
Selection Procedures 
The decision to use ISP can be made at different stages in the processing 
of an offender and by different officials in the justice system. The most 
noteworthy decision points are at sentencing, at probation and parole 
revocation proceedings, and at sentence review or resentencing hearings 
after a prison sentence has been given. 
Criteria for program eligIbility vary from state to state. All ISP programs 
try to assess the risks presented by each offender. Sometimes only first-time 
,)ffenders are eligIble; usually violent offenders are disqualified. Probation 
lfficers and judges also consider other criteria such as whether the offender 
as untreatable drug or alcohol problems, an unstable family situation, 
nd/or a poor employment record. 
The selection rules in Georgia's Intensive Probation Supervision (IPS) 
1rogram stipulate that participants be "serious but nonviolent offenders" 
~ho, without the intensive supervision option, would have gone to prison in 
the jurisdiction under which they were sentenced· (Erwin 1986a,18). This 
leads to rejecting high-risk individuals and probation revocation cases. 
Georgia's IPS uses two methods for selecting offenders. In one process, 
offenders who have already been sent to prison are chosen. Inmates are 
screened for potential assignment to IPS, and recommendations are made to 
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the sentencing judges to resentence offenders to IPS. In the other methOd, 
judges sentence offenders directly to IPS (Erwin 1986a). 
The latter route raises questions about whether IPS results in true dive 
sion. Analysis of the offender groups assigned to regular probation, IPS, an~ 
prison in Georgia shows that sixty percent of the IPS clients had profiles that 
were more similar to prison inmates than to probationers (U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Assistance 1987). This implies that forty percent of the IPS Clients 
were not diverted from prison and that IPS may have been used as an add-on 
punishment instead of an alternative to prison for some offenders. It also 
suggests that claims about money saved (IPS is less expensive than prison) 
may need to be moderated in Georgia's case. 
New Jersey's Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) has an inventive way 
of guaranteeing that its clients are real divertees. In New Jersey, judges 
cannot sentence an offender directly to ISP. Instead, offenders may apply to 
the program after they reach prison (Pearson and Bibel 1986). ISP officers 
screen potential clients. All persons sentenced to a state prison term are 
eligible unless they are convicted of homicide, robbery, or sex crimes. 
Offenders also may be excluded for having too many prior offenses or a his-
tory of violence. Most of those selected for ISP are burglars, minor thieves 
small-time drug sellers, and persons convicted of fraud who have served 
about four months of their sentence before being released into ISP (Pearson 
and BibeI1986). 
New Jersey's Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) 
has an inventive way of guaranteeing that 
its clients are real divertees ... judges cannot sentence 
an offender directly to ISP. Instead, offenders 
may apply to the program after they reach prison. 
After an ISP officer investigates an applicant, an ISP screening board, 
which is made up of citizen members, reviews the applicant'S suitability for 
ISP and then interviews the applicant to gauge whether there is motivation 
to succeed in the program. Next, the board either rejects the case or recom-
mends it to the ISP resentencing panel. A six-judge resentencing panel then 
conducts a hearing to decide whether the applicant will remain in prison or 
be released into ISP. This panel also reviews the progress of all program 
participants every ninety days, hears allegations of program violations, and 
decides whether ISP violators will be returned to prison (New Jersey 
Administrative Office of the Courts 1988). 
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While the selection process in New Jersey was set up to ensure diversion 
f ISP offenders, one side effect was a slow admissions rate to the program. It 
~equired almost a year to reach full caseload (Baird 1984, Clear 1986). 
stringency of Supervision 
The degree of supervision provided depends on the offender clientele. 
periodiC checks made by probation officers, in person and by phone, are the 
most common kind of supervision in ISPs. Some jurisdictions use electronic 
monitoring. 
The Georgia program requires six to twelve months of supervision and 
haS three phases. The first two phases each last three months. In Phase I, 
there are five contacts with a probation officer per week. This declines to 
twO contacts per week by Phase m. There is a mandatory curfew of 10:00 
p.m. to 6:00 am. during all these phases. 
Each offender must perform 132 hours of community service and either 
be employed or perform extra community service until a job can be found. 
Participation in routine, unannounced alcohol and drug testing is also 
required. In addition, each probationer must pay a $10-50 monthly surveil-
lance fee (Erwin 1987). 
A team method of supervision is used, with one probation officer and one 
surveillance officer assigned to 25 probationers, or one probation officer and 
two surveillance officers assigned to 40 probationers. Each offender must 
follow behavioral standards, and submit to surveillance adequate to minimize 
risk to the community and allow for rehabilitative counseling. 
In New Jersey, each offender selected for ISP receives twenty face-to-face 
contacts per month during the first fourteen months of an eighteen-month 
program. Some offenders are checked frequently for curfew violations by 
electronic monitoring, and over eighty percent of the participants are 
screened periodically for drugs (Pearson 1985). 
New Jersey requires each offender to find employment within thirty days 
of release from the program and to perform sixteen hours of community 
service per month. Some offenders pay fines or make restitution, and some 
receive counseling and treatment for behavioral problems such as drug abuse 
(Pearson 1985). 
Caseloads in the New Jersey program are about twenty participants per 
officer. Officers spend eighty percent of their time directing field supervision. 
Most of this time is spent seeing offenders at their homes, jobs, treatment 
programs, and community service sites. Officers work flexible hours because 
evenings and weekends are prime supervision times. They work out of their 
residences and go to regional offices only for paperwork and staff meetings 
(New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts 1988). 
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Community Protection 
Georgia's IPS Program. How well does intensive supervision control 
offenders? Georgia reports that of the 2,322 people in its program between 
1982 and 1985, 370 (sixteen percent) absconded or had their probation 
revoked (Erwin and Bennett 1987). The remaining 1,952 were diverted 
successfully from prison. Only 0.8 percent of IPS probationers were COn-
victed of any violent personal crimes while under IPS. Most of the IPS 
clients' new crimes were violations of drug and alcohol laws, and nOne 
resulted in serious bodily injury to a victim (Erwin and Bennett 1987). 
A comparison of results for 200 IPS probationers, 200 regular 
probationers, and 97 prison releases after an eighteen-month period, shOWed 
that IPS probationers had lower reconviction rates (18.5 percent) than either 
regular probationers (24.0 percent) or prison releases (42.3 percent) (Erwin 
and Bennett 1987). In addition, the IPS group was convicted of fewer serious 
new crimes against persons than either of the other two groups. AlthOUgh 
more IPS probationers violated the conditions of probation than did regular 
probationers (7 percent compared to 4.5 percent), and more IPS 
probationers were re-arrested than regular probationers (40.0 percent com-
pared to 35.5 percent), this might be expected because ISP probationers 
were so closely supervised that any illegal actions would be extremely difficult 
to hide. It was not expected that only 1 of the sample of 200 IPS probationers 
would abscond, compared to 4 of the 200 regular probationers (Erwin and 
Bennett 1987). 
Drug offenders were the most successful in the IPS program. They had a 
ninety percent success rate during the eighteen-month follow-up study 
period. Random urinalysis, monitoring, frequent contact, and curfews during 
the evening and on weekends may be especially effective in controlling drul 
offenders (Erwin and Bennett 1987). 
New Jersey's ISP Program. New Jersey's program reports that of 1,147 
offenders assigned to ISP from 1983 to August 1987, 400 (thirty-five 
percent) are still in ISP, 394 (thirty-four percent) have successfully com· 
pleted the program, 342 (thirty percent) have been returned to prison, and 
11 (one percent) have either died or had their prison sentences overturned. 
Among the 342 who were returned to prison, 249 were returned for violating 
program rules and 93 for committing new crimes. The high percentage of 
participants returning to prison is the result of frequent drug monitoring and 
curfew checks (New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts 1988). 
Recidivism among New Jersey's ISP graduates has been low. Since 1984, 
327 participants have successfully completed ISP. According to New Jersey 
State Police criminal history records, only fourteen (four percent) of ISP 
graduates since 1984 have been convicted of new offenses. Nine of the 
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fourteen graduates were convicted of disorderly persons offenses such as 
shoplifting. None of the offenses involved violence (New Jersey Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts 1988). 
The findings from New Jersey are ambiguous. On one hand, ISP 
offenders and prison offenders were significantly different in terms of prior 
felony convictions, with the ISP group having an average of 2.2 prior felony 
convictions compared with an average of 5.1 for inmates in New Jersey's 
prisOns. Also, ISP participants were more likely to have jobs at the time of 
the current offense and were better educated than prison inmates (Pearson 
and BibeI1986). On the other hand, ISP participants during the study period 
were real felons - two-thirds of them had prior felony convictions (Pearson 
and Bibel1986). 
In Georgia, IPS cost nearly $7,000 less than prison, 
per offender, each year . ... In New Jersey in 1987, 
the annual cost per ISP participant was $5,208, 
compared to $22,000 for prison. 
The main policy implication of the fmdings on community protection 
from both Georgia and New Jersey is this: If certain kinds of offenders are 
placed under intensive supervision, there is a limited risk to the community. 
Cost-Effectiveness of ISP 
One of the appeals of ISP is its relatively low price compared to prison. 
Policymakers must decide whether the money that could be saved through 
intensive probation justifies its risks and benefits. 
In Georgia, IPS costs nearly $7,000 less than prison, per offender, each 
year (excluding what might otherwise have been spent on building new 
prisons). If all 2,322 offenders placed in IPS from 1982-85 were diverted from 
prison, more than $13 million was saved (Erwin and Bennett 1987). One 
reason for such a large savings is that Georgia's IPS probationers pay super-
vision fees. 
In New Jersey in 1987, the annual cost per ISP participant was $5,208, 
compared to $22,000 for prison. Program costs were further offset because 
ISP participants paid federal and state taxes, fines, child support, restitution, 
and supervision fees, and contributed free community service. When these 
monetary benefits of ISP are considered, the net cost of ISP is less than 
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$2,000 per year for each participant (New Jersey Administrative Office 0 
the Courts 1988). 
On the national level, the Rand Corporation (Petersilia 1986) us~ 
information from its nationwide survey of innovations in probation to caiCU. 
late estimates of annual costs per offender of intensive probation and othel 
alternative sentences. Table 7 indicates that intensive probation is mUCh 
cheaper than incarceration in jail or prison. Home detention costs nearly the 
same as intensive probation, depending on whether electronic monitoring ~ 
used as part of home detention. 
Table 7 - Comparisons of the Costs of Alternative Sentences 
-------------------------------------------An--n-ua-I~C-os-t------
~~~~o~fP~ro~~~m~ ______________________________ ~P~er~O~f~re~n=de~r _____ _ 
Routine probation 
Intensive probation 
Home detention· 
Local jail 
S ta te prison 
$300-$2,000 
$2,000-$7,000 
$2,000-$8,500 
$8,000-$12,000 
$9,000-$20,000 
• Costs of the home detention program depend on whether electronic monitoring is used. 
Source: Rand Corporation. 
Prison Population Reduction 
The cost savings promised by intensive probation depend on whether it 
actually diverts offenders from prison. Georgia's success in reducing it! 
prison population through IPS predicts what could happen if Nebraska weI( 
to adopt Georgia's model. 
Before establishing IPS in 1982, Georgia had the highest incarceration 
rate in the United States. Georgia's elected judges gave harsh sentences and 
sent to prison many felons who would not have gone to prison in other state! 
(Otten 1987). So Georgia's offenders may be unusually low-risk by national 
standards. As the analysis of Nebraska's prison population has shown, 
Nebraska also has many low-risk offenders who could be eligible for inten· 
sive probation. 
Evidence from Georgia, which implemented IPS in 1982, indicates that 
following the introduction of IPS (from 1982 through 1985) there was a ten 
percent reduction in felons sentenced to prison. During the same period, the 
percentage of offenders placed on probation increased ten percent - from 
sixty-three percent in 1982 to seventy-three percent in 1985 (Erwin and 
Bennett 1987). 
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Additional Benefits 
In Georgia, IPS probationers produced thousands of hours of public 
ervice, such as working at maintenance and other jobs in hospitals, parks, ~y care centers, and charity programs. Even if these hours are valued at 
nUniIDum wage, the contnoution to society is large (Erwin and Bennett 
1987). 
Other benefits can be achieved through intensive probation. For 
example, offenders who are placed on intensive probation instead of being 
sent to prison do not lose their jobs, and their families are not forced to 
receive welfare support. Also, offenders on intensive probation can pay taxes 
and make restitution while avoiding the criminal influences of prison. 
- Offenders who are placed on intensive probation 
instead of being sent to prison do not lose their jobs, 
and their families are not forced to receive welfare support. 
political Acceptability 
The results of a recent survey of Nebraska's correctional policymakers 
show the political feasibility of ISP in Nebraska (Hoffman and Webb 1987). 
The survey gauged how receptive the persons who are instrumental in 
making correctional policy in Nebraska are to various solutions to the over-
crowding problem. 
Personal interviews were conducted with selected legislators, correctional 
administrators, judges, prosecutors, police administrators, and other criminal 
justice officials who form correctional policy in Nebraska. These 
policymakers were asked to indicate their approval or disapproval of 
different solutions to the prison overcrowding problem. 
A major finding of this survey was that there is strong support among 
Nebraska policymakers for intensive probation. Eighteen of the 25 
policymakers interviewed said they approve of intensive probation for first-
time, nonviolent offenders. Two of the policymakers were neutral to inten-
sive probation, four were opposed, and one was undecided. 
Policymakers also were asked whether it would be feasible to implement 
intensive probation in Nebraska All of them said it would be politically as 
well as economically feasible, as long as taxes were not increased. 
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Supervision Fees as a Funding Source 
Supervision fees are a potential source of funding ISP in Nebraska. The 
National Institute of Corrections (NIC) reports that twenty-three states are 
charging supervision fees to probationers and parolees (NIC 1983) 
Probation fees partially support Georgia's highly successful IPS (Erwin and 
Bennett 1987). 
Three types of services for which fees are being charged in other states 
are: (1) room and board in transitional residential programs (for example 
restitution centers and halfway houses); (2) fees for specific services (fo; 
example, substance abuse counseling); and (3) fees for correctional super. 
vision (NIC 1983). 
The usual method of collecting supervision fees is to charge a unifonn 
monthly rate, usually $10 or $15 (NIC 1983). Other methods include a fee 
for a specified period of supervision (for example, $100 for six months); 
monthly rates set within an allowable range (for example, $10-$50); discre. 
tionary rates based on an offender's ability to pay and the costs of probation 
services; and a combined flat rate and monthly fee, which requires the 
offender to make an initial probation user payment and then pay a monthly 
fee (NIC 1983). 
To avoid discrimination against poor offenders, supervision fee programs 
allow a waiver or reduction of payments in some situations. States waive or 
reduce supervision fees for offenders who are physically or mentally 
incapable of working, whose income falls below the poverty level, and who 
have a large number of dependents to provide for (NIC 1983). 
Proponents of supervision fees say that the programs provide substantial 
revenue. In the Georgia IPS program, for example, fee collections through 
the fITst four years of IPS exceeded total IPS costs (Erwin 1986). This does 
not mean that IPS probationers alone have supported the program. IPS was 
initially a pilot program in thirteen of Georgia's forty-fIve judicial districts 
and was supported partially by fees collected statewide from regular 
probationers (Erwin 1986). 
Two important questions associated with fee programs are: Who should 
receive the revenue? and, How should it be spent? Probation and parole 
agencies argue that they are entitled to the money because they use their 
resources to collect it. In Georgia, for example, funds are used to support 
IPS and other innovations in probation. However, in nine of the 23 states 
that collect fees, revenues are returned to the state's general fund, where the 
money does not have to be spent on corrections (NIC 1983). 
Opponents of supervision claim that fee programs do not generate much 
revenue, place unfair burdens on offenders who already have enough finan-
cial responsibilities, encourage inequities in the justice system, and risk legal 
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nallenges (NIe 1983). NIe data on fee programs in 23 states, however, 
~stablish the following facts about these programs: 
• Substantial amounts of money can be raised from supervision fee 
programs. 
• Moderate fees can be collected from a majority of the probation! 
parole populations. 
• Guidelines can be established to assure equitable enforcement of 
supervision fee payments. 
• No significant legal challenges have succeeded in curtailing the prac-
tice of collecting supervision fees (NIe 1983). 
- National opinion polls indicate that the public 
wants criminals punished, but that it is unwilling to pay 
for more prisons. Polls also indicate that 
the public is supportive of non prison forms of punishment. 
The policy implication for Nebraska regarding NIC's findings is that 
supervision fees would be a practical way of generating revenue to support 
intensive probation. Furthermore, using supervision fees to defray program 
costs might make it easier to market ISP to Nebraskans. Money for initiating 
IPS, however, would have to come from another source. 
Summary and Suggested Policy Actions 
Editor's note: The NebraskIJ Probation Administration began planning a pilot intensive proba-
tion program in the summer of 1988 (Keller 1988). No details of the program ~ available at the 
time of this writing. 
Prison overcrowding will remain a serious problem in Nebraska in the 
near future. Increases in prison admissions and in lengths of stay are the 
main factors adding to Nebraska's prison population. Nebraska's answer to 
the problem has been to expand prison capacity and to implement programs 
to reduce length of stay. 
This strategy of increasing prison capacity is premised on the perception 
that the public wants harsh forms of punishment. Indeed, national opinion 
polls indicate that the public wants criminals punished, but that it is unwill-
ing to pay for more prisons. Polls also indicate that the public is supportive 
of nonprison forms of punishment. 
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Nebraska policymakers should give serious consideration to poli 
options featuring nonprison forms of punishment. Data from the Nebras~ 
Parole Board's files show that there currently are many prison inmates who 
are not dangerous enough to require imprisonment. Many of these non. 
violent offenders with marginal criminal histories could be diverted into 
intensive probation programs that are more cost-effective than incarcera. 
tion. 
Nebraska should develop pilot intensive supervision programs in Omaha 
and Lincoln with the goal of reducing prison admissions by 50 to 100 
commitments per year. If the goal of the pilot programs is to provide a COst. 
effective alternative to prison, safeguards should be established to ensure 
that diversion takes place. The selection of inappropriate offenders for ISP 
(for example, those who do not require additional control and who WOuld 
not ordinarily be sent to prison) wastes program space and causes an 
increase in correctional costs (Mathias 1986). 
Nebraska should develop pilot intensive supervision programs 
in Omaha and Lincoln with the goal of reducing 
prison admissions by 50 to 100 commitments per year. 
Carefully designed procedures for monitoring the implementation of 
selection methods are the best precautionary measures. Because of the 
tendency of some Nebraska judges to sentence NVOZs to prison, it is 
unlikely that a large enough part of the target popUlation could be diverted 
through a selection method like Georgia's, which makes intensive probation 
a judicial sentencing option. A more effective method would be one like New 
Jersey's, which considers only offenders who have already received a prison 
sentence. One drawback, however, is that this method is slow in admitting 
offenders into programs. 
Successful implementation of ISP pilot programs in Nebraska will require 
that the public's demand for punishment be satisfied. Policymakers should 
tailor pilot programs to serve as punishment as well as diversion. New Jersey 
runs the most punitive program, selecting offenders only after they have 
been imprisoned. New Jersey's approach combines elements of probation 
and incarceration. 
Nebraska policymakers may want to consider requiring offenders to 
spend a brief period, such as 30 days, in prison before selection for ISP. Such 
an approach has the advantages of providing more protection to the 
community and of possibly shocking offenders into a realization that they 
must end their criminal involvement. Disadvantages are that adding a shock 
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feature to ISP increases the costs of the program (because a short time in 
prison costs more than a short time in IPS) and subjects ISP clients to the 
potentially negative influences of prison. 
The punitive benefits of intensive probation can also be increased by 
including multiple requirements. Programs in New Jersey and Georgia, for 
example, require offenders to perform community service without pay, to pay 
fines and supervision fees, to submit to frequent drug testing, to engage in 
full-time work, to abide by curfews, to participate in counseling, and to make 
restitution to victims. 
-
ISP is a proven, cost-effective approach for 
alleviating prison overcrowding. 
The issue of punitiveness of the pilot programs has public relations 
dimensions. Developers of ISP programs in Nebraska should be concerned 
with gaining public support for the placement of ISP offenders in the 
community. One strategy that has worked in other states is to form an ISP 
advisory group including citizens, the media, and representatives of criminal 
justice agencies (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1987). 
Beyond these issues in program development and implementation, 
Nebraska policymakers need to realize that ISP is a realistic policy choice. 
ISP is a proven, cost-effective approach for alleviating prison overcrowding; 
it has the potential for meeting the public's demand for punishment; and 
equally important, it is economically and politically feasible. 
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Endnotes 
1. This study is modeled after the prison diversion studies conducted in Michigan (BYnu 
Morash, Davidson, and Basta 1987) and New York (Mathias 1986). Ill, 
2. Drug offenses include the crimes of administering narcotics to addicts, dealing in narcor 
or controlled substances, possessing a controlled substance except marijuana, possessing m~CS 
than one pound of marijuana, delivering or distributing a dangerous substance, and (for re; 
tered persons) intentionally violating drug laws. 
3. This money was made available through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 
4. The mean or average is not as useful as the median for examining length of stay over tim 
because extreme values affect the mean. The median is simply the middle number in a distribu~ 
tion. 
5. DCS data indicate that longer sentences have not been a major factor contributing to 
increases in length of stay. The median minimum sentence actually decreased from 18 months 
in 1978 to 14 months in 1986, while the median maximum sentence was 36 months for every 
year from 1978 to 1986 (DCS 1986d). 
6. To speed the parole process, the Nebraska Parole Board recently advanced parole hearing 
schedules in order to permit the early identification and release of parole-eligible inmates. This 
allows more time to develop approved living and work arrangements, assuring that fewer 
paroles are delayed beyond eligible release dates. The parole board also increased the frequency 
of parole hearings to clear backlogs of "quick dippers," or prisoners who are sentenced to one 
year or less for committing Class I misdemeanors (Bartee 1988). As a result of these and other 
efforts, the number of adult parolees in Nebraska jumped from 283 in February of 1987 to 420 
in February of 1988 (DCS 1988). 
7. Although the number of males in Nebraska who are between the ages of eighteen and 
thirty-nine peaked at 291,695 in 1985, the projection of males between these ages for 1990 is 
289,144, which is not a very significant decrease (DCS 1986e). 
8. The rated capacities of the Nebraska State Penitentiary and the Lincoln Correctional 
Center are 150 percent of their design capacities. (Design capacity is the number of inmates 
that planners or architects intended for a facility.) DCS administrators have determined the 
rated capacities of Nebraska's other prisons in terms of design, population and staffing (DCS 
1986a). 
9. Data on the average square feet per cell at the Nebraska Center for Women were unavail· 
able. 
10. Gaes and McGuire (1984) used longitudinal data, multiple institutions, and multiple 
measures of overcrowding, and also controlled for inmate characteristics (for example, age and 
prior record) and inmate prison activities (for example, education and work assignment). 
11. The Nebraska Legislature approved part of the DCS request and provided money for the 
renovation of the Hastings facility, which opened in 1987. DCS plans to resubmit its proposal 
for funds to build the other two proposed correctional facilities (Falconer 1988). 
12. DCS also uses prerelease, work release, and furloughs to relieve pressure on the prisons 
from overpopulation. 
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13. This estimate was derived by multiplying the per capita cost of housing an inmate at the 
omaha Correctional Center ($13,983) by the number of male NVOb sentenced to prison in 
1987 (N = 235), by multiplying the per capita cost of housing an inmate at the Nebraska Center 
f r Women ($21,331) by the number of female NVOb sentenced to prison in 1987 (N = 46), 
o d by summing the totals. This method may Slightly overestimate costs because it counts the 54 a~fenders who were admitted and discharged in 1987 as staying in prison all year, and some 
Offenders may be placed in community corrections centers (which are cheaper than prisons) 
~fore the end of their first year in prison. This overcounting, however, would be partially 
counterbalanced by the male NVOb who are sent to the Nebraska State Penitentiary, where 
the per capita cost is $17,045, instead of the Omaha Correctional Center. 
14. Hou~ arrest programs restrict offenders' free-time activities in order to reduce their 
opportunities to commit crimes. The least restrictive form of house arrest involves curfews; the 
roost restrictive form uses a computer and an electronic monitoring device to monitor com-
pliance with program requirements. House arrest may be part of ISP, or it may exist apart from 
ISP, as is the case with Nebraska's house parole program. 
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appropriations would have been required to have a net positive 
impact on Nebraska before the export permit could be issued. 
• Explicitly limited surface water interbasin transfers, groundwater 
municipal transfers, and groundwater industrial transfers to instate 
transfers, thus requiring anyone wishing to export water under these 
statutes to obtain an export permit. 
LB 151, the second bill introduced during 1987, was similar to LB 146 in: 
• Authorizing a water exports and transfers study; 
• Making surface water rights freely transferable; and 
• Restricting surface water exports, interbasin transfers, groundwater 
municipal transfers, and groundwater industrial transfers to instate 
transfers only. 
However, LB 151 went further than LB 146 in giving the Water Manage_ 
ment Board responsibility for promoting water exports. LB 151 would have 
authorized the board to find buyers for Nebraska's water, construct water 
export projects, and use the profits from export water sales to construct new 
water projects in Nebraska. LB 151 also authorized instate groundwater 
transfers for any purpose, greatly expanding instate groundwater transfer 
authorities. However, the quantity of groundwater that could be transferred 
could not exceed current withdrawals from an existing well or net annual 
recharge for withdrawals from new wells, both of which would have severely 
limited groundwater transfers. Finally, half of the proceeds received by 
Nebraska landowners from private groundwater exports would be paid to the 
state to help construct water projects. 
Water Export Policy Assumptions. LB 146 and LB 151 were based on 
two premises: That Sporhase requires states to treat instate water uses and 
exports exactly the same, and that Nebraska, having abundant groundwater 
supplies, should sell some of its surplus water to further water resource 
development within the state. While neither premise is unreasonable, they 
both can be challenged First, Sporhase allows states to establish a limited 
preference for instate water uses, although the limits of that preference have 
yet to be defined. This contradicts the notion that whatever applies to 
exports must apply equally to instate uses. Thus, the challenge is not simply 
to come up with instate policies that will accomplish water export policy 
objectives - although that is a critical part of any water export strategy. The 
challenge is to test the Sporhase decision by creatively defining in statutes 
and administrative practice a limited instate preference that protects impor-
tant local values and purposes - economic and noneconomic alike - that do 
not impermissibly intrude upon interstate commerce. While this is no easy 
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task, it is a choice which should not be simply dismissed, as it was in LB 146 
andLB 151. 
The second premise, that Nebraska has surplus water which should be 
sold to facilitate water resource development, is even more controversial. 
The definition of surplus is subjective and depends entirely upon the values 
one wishes to protect. For example, if one wishes to protect wet meadows in 
the Sandhills or to maintain streamflows in the Loup River system, there is 
little surplus groundwater in Nebraska. If, however, providing clean drinking 
water to residents of the Southwest is considered fIrst, the protection of the 
wet meadows in the Sandhills to maintain a ranching economy and way of life 
has lower political priority, and there is surplus water in Nebraska. 
LB 146 and LB 151 were based on two premises: 
That Sporhase requires states to treat instate water uses 
and exports exactly the same, and that Nebraska, having 
abundant groundwater supplies, should sell some of its 
surplus water to further water resource development 
within the state. While neither premise is 
unreasonable, they both can be challenged. 
Even assuming that, for the sake of argument, there is surplus water 
available in Nebraska, selling it to construct water resource projects to 
increase or maintain irrigation is questionable. Since World War II, one of 
the major farm policy issues has been coping with grain surpluses. While 
there have been brief periods of low grain stocks and high world grain prices, 
the last three decades have been characterized by surplus grain. This has led 
to federal programs to pay farmers not to plant grain, which has been an 
important factor in reduced federal spending for water projects: it does not 
pay to increase irrigation of surplus crops, especially when the producers of 
those crops are then entitled to federal crop subsidies. The double-subsidy 
aspect of federal water projects - using irrigation water subsidized by federal 
taxpayers to grow surplus crops for which the taxpayers must pay again -
has helped critics of the federal reclamation program curtail program 
funding. 
To suggest, then, that Nebraska should sell its water so that it can build 
water projects to produce additional crop surpluses ignores economic reality. 
Improved production techniques in South America and Asia have allowed 
other countries to produce grain at least as cheaply as it can be produced in 
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Nebraska. And biotechnology holds the further promise of increased yields 
without irrigation. Thus, a policy based on selling water to increase surplus 
crop production is short sighted and may lead to the economic demise of 
those it seeks to help. 
If Nebraska decides to export its water for money, 
developing new irrigation projects is not the only potential 
use of this new state revenue and is clearly not 
the most desirable use. 
The use of state proceeds from water exports is an important decision 
which deserves wide debate. Groundwater quality protection, soil conserva. 
tion, and instream flows protection are simply a beginning in terms of 
important natural resources programs that deserve increased state funding. 
Other alternative uses of state revenues from water exports are: education, 
economic development, and transportation improvements. The point is that 
if Nebraska decides to export its water for money, developing new irrigation 
projects is not the only potential use of this new state revenue and is clearly 
not the most desirable use. 
In summary, LB 146 and LB 151 are based on the mistaken premise that 
water exports and water right exports are inevitable and therefore the state 
should attempt to take ftnancial advantage of the situation. While Nebraska 
does need to evaluate policy options carefully relative to Sporhase, it must 
evaluate all possible options, not simply those that lend themselves to 
increased water development. 
Political Response. Both LB 146 and LB 151 contain several contro· 
versial and emotionally charged issues: that the state should aggressively sell 
its water, that water rights should be freely transferable, and that interbasin 
groundwater transfers should be authorized. Each issue alone would 
generate significant political controversy; the combination of all three issues 
in any single bill would make it politically impossible to enact. This W& 
borne out in the public hearings on LB 146 and LB 151. 
The hearings demonstrated that people generally did not comprehend all 
aspects of the proposed bills, and in any event there was little political 
support for enacting the bills into law. Interested groups, including the 
Nebraska Farm Bureau, the Nebraska Farmers Union and the Nebraska 
Sierra Club, generally voiced support for only the study provisions of LB 146 
and opposed the more aggressive water export promotion of LB 151. After 
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the hearings, the Natural Resources Committee approved only the water 
xport study provisions and removed all other provisions from LB 146. 
~rovisions removing the requirement for legislative approval for surface 
water exports were added to LB 146 by amendment and the bill was enacted 
into law. 
Studying Water Exports and Transfers in Nebraska 
As finally enacted, LB 146 recited legislative findings that surface water 
and groundwater were being transferred from the land where they occurred 
to users within and outside of Nebraska, and that such transfers were likely 
to increase as water shortages occurred within and outside of Nebraska. The 
legislature also found that Nebraska enjoyed generally abundant water 
supplies and a chronic overabundance in some areas. Finally, the legislature 
declared that state government should provide an orderly mechanism for 
transferring water from areas of surplus to areas of shortage, to provide for 
compensating individual landowners and the public for such transfers, and to 
balance the rights of individual landowners and the public against the free 
market forces that compel the use of water where it brings the greatest 
economic return. 
LB 146 then directed the Water Management Board to prepare a study 
which would: 
• Analyze current legal, statutory, physical, social, environmental and 
economic impediments to surface and groundwater transfers; 
• Develop a statutory framework to permit water transfers while 
protecting the environment and the rights of landowners and the 
public; 
• Develop a statutory framework to compensate those harmed by water 
transfers and also the state of Nebraska on behalf of the general 
public; 
• Identify potential users and markets for water exports, transfers, and 
water right sales; 
• Identify economically feasible water transfer and export oppor-
tunities; and 
• Identify an appropriate state role in facilitating and regulating water 
right transfers ~llld exports. 
The report was presented to the legislature and governor November 30, 
1988. A draft report was made available July 15, 1988, and the public com-
ment period ended August 30, 1988. 
The final version of LB 146 as adopted by the Unicameral contained the 
same limiting assumptions that were in its original version: that water 
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The LB 146 study does not evaluate the entire range 
of legal and political options available to respond to 
the Sporhase decision, but rather only a subset of 
those options which are favorable to water development. 
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exports and transfers are inevitable and Nebraska should try to take 
advantage of the situation. The LB 146-mandated study was not required to 
include either an evaluation of Sporhase or a definition of the legal limits of 
the Sporhase decision, and in fact makes the same simplifying assumption. 
Thus the LB 146 study was not intended to evaluate the entire range of legal 
and political options available to respond to the Sporhase decision, but 
rather only a subset of those options favorable to water development. 
Despite the limitations imposed by the legislature, the Water Manage_ 
ment Board study provides a careful analysis of potential water transfers and 
exports and their impacts on Nebraska. The July 15, 1988, draft report 
included five proposed bills to meet the requirements of LB 146. The topics 
addressed by the five proposed bills are as follows (see table 1 for a COm-
parison of these bills with current water laws, and with additional policy 
options discussed in the concluding section of the chapter): 
• Water transfer regulations, 
• Rights to saved water, 
• Water use fees, 
• State water transfer promotion, and 
• State water transfer projects. 
Each bill, if introduced, will be highly controversial. 
Water Transfers Regulation 
If enacted, the first draft bill would represent a major departure from past 
water legislation in Nebraska. The bill would authorize water rights transfers 
and establish uniform rules for both surface and groundwater exports and 
instate transfers. The bill would define for the first time in Nebraska what 
constitutes a transfer of groundwater and would require permits for 
groundwater transfers away from the section within which the well is located 
However, permits would not be required for groundwater used solely for 
domestic (household, not including livestock watering) purposes or for the 
Table 1 ~ Effect of Water Management Board-Proposed Bi.J.b on Nebraska's Water Policies 
Cilrrent Policy 
WMB Proposal 
Other Alternatives 
Surface Water Right Sales 
Can be sold for same 
purpose within same 
river basin. 
Could be sold for different 
purposes in different river 
basins and across state lines. 
a. Limit purposes for which 
water rights can be 
purchased to instream 
flows protection. 
b. Limit purposes for which 
water rights can be 
purchased to water 
exchanges. 
Water Exports 
Surface water and groundwater 
can be exported with 
DWR permit, permits may 
be denied in public interest 
Same plus new environmental 
impact .tatement and 
mitigation/compensation 
required. 
a. Do nothing. 
b. Discourage exports by better 
defining public interest 
factors to protect Nebraska 
water uses. 
c. Discourage ground water 
exports by regulating 
groundwater use to reduce 
or prevent groundwater 
depletion. 
d. Discourage surface water 
exports by .. tablishing 
minimum stream flow 
reQuirements. 
e. G~e .tate greater control 
(JIIer exports through state 
water leasing. 
t Explore Sporha.re instate 
water use preference. 
Instate interbasm Ground-
water Transfers 
Allowed for municipal and 
industrial purposes only 
with DWR permit 
Allow agricultural ground-
water transfers (as well 
as municipal, industrial 
transfers) on same basis 
as water exports. 
Make transfers subject to 
strict groundwater use 
regulations to prevent 
or limit depletion. 
Instate Imerbasin Surface 
Wa1erTrans.[ers 
Allow for any purpose with 
DWR permit if state 
benefits outweigh state 
environmental and 
economic costs. 
Make surface water 
transfers subject to 
same requirements 
as exports (public 
interest, environmental 
impact statement). 
Make transfers subject 
to instream flow 
requirements. 
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irrigation of up to 160 acres of an adjacent section. The new requirements 
would apply to virtually all surface water appropriation applications except 
instream flow applications, and to all nonexempt groundwater transfers off 
the section where the well is located. Thus, groundwater transfers for 
agricultural purposes would be authorized for the first time in Nebraska. 
A permit would be required from the DWR for groundwater and 
surface-water transfers and exports, and surface water rights sales. The 
applicant would be required to prepare a full impact analysis of the propOsed 
transfer, export, or water rights sale. The required impact analysis, which is 
modeled after federal environmental impact statement requirements, wOuld 
include: 
• The social, economic, physical, and environmental effects of the 
proposed action; 
• Any unavoidable adverse impacts; 
• Alternatives to the proposed action; 
• The relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; 
• Any irreversible and irretrievable resource commitments; and 
• Alternatives and recommendations when the proposed action 
involves unresolved conflicts regarding alternative resource uses. 
Transfers, exports, or water rights sales involving small quantities of water, 
or obviously having no adverse impacts, would be administratively exempted 
from the impact statement requirement. The impact statement requirement 
would provide environmental protection requirements not available in water 
rights proceedings, an important innovation. 
The DWR director would first determine, in consultation with 
appropriate state agencies, whether any of the adverse effects identified in 
the impact statement could be avoided through compensation or mitigation. 
For example, if a proposed groundwater transfer or export would lower the 
water levels in nearby wells, that adverse impact could be mitigated by agree-
ing to pay the costs of installing deeper wells. The same adverse impact could 
be avoided through compensating those landowners whose wells would be 
harmed by the groundwater transfer or export by paying for the replacement 
of their wells. Similarly, if a surface water diversion would interfere with 
wildlife habitat, that adverse impact could be mitigated by agreeing to 
minimum flow requirements to maintain habitat during critical periods, or by 
providing substitute water or habitat. If the DWR director determined that 
such compensation or mitigation was appropriate, the director would be 
required to specify such measures as a condition to granting the permit. 
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After the DWR director had considered how to handle adverse impacts, 
the proposed transfer permit, export permit, or water rights transfer permit 
would be required to be approved: 
• If the applicant agreed to all conditions imposed by the director; 
• If the director determined that the benefits of the proposed use or 
transfer would clearly outweigh any adverse impacts which could be 
avoided, compensated or mitigated; and 
• If the proposed action was consistent with all other applicable laws, 
such as the Nebraska endangered species act. 
If anyone of these three requirements was not met, the permit would be 
required to be denied in the public interest. 
In determining whether the benefits of the proposed water transfer or 
use clearly outweighed any unavoidable, uncompensable, and unmitigated 
adverse impacts, the director's considerations would be required to include: 
• The economic, environmental and other benefits of the proposed use 
or transfer; 
• The nature and extent of remaining adverse social, economic, physical 
and environmental impacts of the proposed transfer or use; 
• Opportunities for future water uses foregone if the proposed transfer 
or use were permitted; 
• Alternative actions and water sources available to the applicant; and 
• Any other factors the director deemed relevant to the public interest 
and to the health and safety of Nebraska's citizens. 
Any permits granted would be conditional on payment of the first annual 
permit fee for the water used or transferred. Permits could be granted for up 
to fifty years, although a permit may be renewed following the same 
procedures as for the original application. Groundwater transfers and 
exports would be limited to no more than 60,000 acre-feet annually - the 
amount of the largest groundwater transfer (from the Platte River to 
Omaha) currently occurring in Nebraska. The quantity of water that could 
be sold with a transfer of surface water appropriations would be the amount 
of water historically consumed, not the entire amount of water diverted This 
would protect the return flows for downstream users. 
The proposed bill is a thoughtful implementation of a comprehensive 
water transfer policy. The impact statement requirement establishes a poten-
tial for substantial environmental protection in water rights proceedings not 
available under current law. This is a significant innovation, although the 
effectiveness of this protection depends entirely upon how such a policy 
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would be implemented by the DWR director. Perhaps more importantly, the 
bill gives the DWR director implicit authority to tip the scales in favor of 
instate uses through the wildcard public interest criterion. Thus, although 
the LB 146 study did not explicitly explore the possibility of favoring instate 
water uses beyond pubic health and safety requirements in water expOrt 
proceedings, the proposed water transfer bill is broad enough to give the 
DWR director sufficient discretion to make that distinction. The bill also 
shows potential exporters how to avoid that public interest determination 
through compensation and mitigation of adverse impacts. 
The impact statement requirement establishes a potential 
for substantial environmental protection in water rights 
proceedings not available under current law. 
While the proposed bill gives the DWR director discretion to establish 
substantial environmental protection conditions and conditions to protect 
local water users, the effectiveness of this approach depends entirely upon 
how the director would implement this authority. Recent DWR adminis-
trative decisions suggest that the director might be more protective of water 
development objectives than of environmental protection. In issuing water 
rights for a proposed Platte River irrigation project, the DWR director 
dismissed a rmding by the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission that the 
project would harm endangered wildlife species and concluded instead that 
the project could not harm wildlife (Pearson and Aiken 1987). Presumably 
the DWR director's attitudes toward water development and environmental 
protection might change if the circumstances pitted export water uses 
against protection of Nebraska environmental resources. 
A related issue is groundwater depletion. While the DWR director would 
have authority to implement a no-depletion policy, the director's discretion 
would also allow a depletion policy to be implemented if compensation or 
mitigation were provided. Natural resource districts, however, would be 
authorized to establish more restrictive groundwater allocation policies 
within groundwater control areas, and these stricter policies would apply to 
exporters. Thus, if an NRD wanted to limit groundwater withdrawals for 
local use and export use to no more than average annual recharge, 
groundwater depletion from water exports could be avoided. However, an 
area with abundant groundwater supplies might have difficulty persuading 
the DWR to approve control area designation (Aiken 1980). 
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Rights to Saved Water 
The second bill would establish rights to saved water and authorize 
t ansfers of the saved water (see table 1). Saved water - also called salvaged 
r ater- refers to water which normally would be consumed or lost in a water 
:e but which is instead saved through an improved use or other water-
aving technology. A common example is lining previously unlined irrigation 
~itches, thus reducing water seepage from the canals. In some states, 
municipalities have shared the cost of lining irrigation canals in exchange for 
a share of the saved water. One difficulty is determining how much water has 
really been saved through the improved practices. Water that might appear 
to be lost may in fact return to the stream or groundwater basin, where it is 
used by others. 
Under the proposed saved water bill, a surface water appropriator 
wishing to install a water-saving practice or technology would first file a 
conservation proposal with the Department of Water Resources, describing 
how the practice would save water. The DWR might approve the water 
conservation proposal if it determined the plan was feasible, would conserve 
water, could be implemented without injuring existing water rights, and was 
not contrary to the public interest. Once the applicant completed the conser-
vation proposal, the DWR would determine the quantity of water saved. Any 
water conserved might be used by the applicant to irrigate additional land, 
reserved for future use, or sold for any purpose, including instream flows. 
The proposed bill would provide financial incentives to save water by 
allowing the appropriator to sell or otherwise use the saved water. The 
difficulty and controversy would come in determining the actual quantity of 
water saved. The return flows issue would be just as controversial in 
Nebraska water rights proceedings as they are in other states. 
Water Use Fees 
The water use fee bill is the vehicle for providing financing for Nebraska 
water projects (see table 1). The bill would require payment of water use fees 
by: 
• Groundwater users irrigating more than 160 acres across a section 
line, 
• Other groundwater users transporting more than 250 acre-feet across 
a section line annually, 
• Surface water users diverting more than five cubic feet per second or 
using more than 1,000 acre-feet annually, 
• Owners of groundwater recharge reservoirs recharging more than 
1,000 acre-feet per year, and 
120 
• Surface water storage reservoir owners storing more than 1,000 acre. 
feet per year. 
The water use fees would vary, depending on the purpose of use. Fo 
public water supply systems (municipal and rural domestic water users) t~ 
fee would be $5 per acre-foot or $8 per service connection (user's chOice) 
For irrigation use, the charge would be $0.50 per a~re foot or $1 per acr~ 
irrigated (user's choice). For industrial, commercial, and power uses, the 
charge would be $1 per acre-foot. The fees collected would be available for 
water development (reservoir construction) purposes. 
The water use fee is likely to be the most controversial feature of the 
water transfers legislative proposals. The fees would be applied to both 
instate uses and out-of-state uses. Most irrigation uses would be exempted, 
but many municipal, rural domestic, and industrial users would be required 
to pay the fees, as would all water exporters. If the fee were im}>Osed 
immediately, it would raise approximately $7 million annually. As disCUSsed 
The water use fee is likely to be the most controversial 
feature of the water transfers legislative proposals. 
-
earlier, there is a real question as to whether revenue such as this should be 
used for increased water development. 
Water Right Transfers Clearinghouse 
Another proposed bill would require the Water Management Board to 
maintain a list of prospective buyers and sellers of water rights and to 
distribute a transfer guide containing information about the transfer procea 
(see table 1). This clearinghouse function would facilitate the water rights 
transfers or sales process, and would provide buyers and sellers with infor· 
mation regarding how to buy and sell water rights. The bill is simply an addi· 
tional option to facilitate the water rights transfer process if such transfen 
are authorized. 
State Water Transfer Projects 
The last proposed water transfers bill would authorize the WatfJ 
Management Board to establish its own water projects (see table 1). TIl 
projects could be for any purpose, including water export. The board couW 
also participate in water projects sponsored by other entities. Board watcl 
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projects would be funded either from legislative appropriations or from 
ater use fees, 
VI Enacting this bill would have little consequence until substantial amounts 
of rnoney were available for water transfer project development. If, for 
exarnple, the water use fee were enacted and all or most of the money 
llocated to water transfer project development, the program would have 
a'gnificant effects on encouraging instate water transfers and water exports. ~~ the absence of such aggressive funding, however, the program would have 
rttle significance. The important issue is program funding rather than the ~etails of the water transfers project development program itself. 
Additional Policy Alternatives 
As indicated earlier, LB 146 was based on the questionable premises that 
the Sporhase decision requires states to treat water exports on the same basis 
as inState water uses and that water exports represent an attractive financial 
opportunity for the state of Nebraska. As a result the LB 146 study examined 
only policy options that would encourage and facilitate exporting water from 
Nebraska. Alternatives to limit water exports, such as those policies 
developed by New Mexico, were not considered. A broader range of policy 
alternatives are available to Nebraskans, more than those considered in the 
LB 146 water transfers study. Additional policy alternatives include a more 
limited authorization of water rights transfers, more restrictive groundwater 
allocation policies, state water appropriation and water marketing, and the 
The LB 146 study examined only policy options that would 
encourage and facilitate exporting water from Nebraska. 
Alternatives to limit water exports, such as those policies 
developed by New Mexico, were not considered. A broader 
range of policy alternatives are available to Nebraskans. 
riskier option of exploring the boundaries of the limited instate preference 
authorized by the Sporhase decision (see table 1 for an overview). 
Water Exports and Transfers Policy Alternatives 
The major political concern regarding water exports and instate inter-
basin water transfers is that the areas from which the water is exported will 
be irreparably harmed. Sandhills residents foresee wet meadows drying up, 
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streamflows diminishing, wetlands disappearing, and, in the extreme, the 
Sandhills blowing away. While these fears are exaggerated, there could be 
significant local groundwater effects extending perhaps several miles from a 
withdrawal site if significant quantities of Sandhills groundwater were 
withdrawn. The policy issue is whether the harm is irreparable or whether it 
can be compensated or mitigated. These are complicated factual determina_ 
tions that must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
The political fact that Sandhills residents may have to accept, unpleasant 
as it may be, is that if water is needed by a more populous region, the thirsty 
population will find political ways to quench its thirst. The choice that the 
water transfer legislative proposals offer residents of water-rich areas is 
whether that water will be purchased or, instead, obtained through pOlitical 
fiat. 
There are many different scales of possible water transfers and exports. 
Most transfers or exports are likely to be similar to the Sporhase transfer 
itself: Small quantities moved over short distances. Larger quantities 
imported over longer distances quickly become expensive and will be a last 
resort among water supply options. For example, the cities of Phoenix , 
Tucson, Denver, and Los Angeles will find it much less expensive to 
purchase local irrigation water rights and convert them to municipal use or 
to develop local water supplies than seeking to import groundwater from 
Nebraska. In the near future, importing Nebraska groundwater to these 
regions is simply not cost-effective. While large-scale exports are possible in 
the future, they are probably at least a generation away. This does not mean 
that this possibility should be dismissed, but rather that if Nebraska 
authorizes water transfers and exports it will not immediately result in mas-
sive exports of water. 
A more likely result is the interbasin transfer of groundwater for irriga-
tion purposes. Several areas of the state, including the central Platte River, 
Blue River, and Republican River basins, are facing groundwater depletion 
from irrigation. These regions are competing for Platte River water rights to 
build surface water irrigation projects to replace some but not all of the 
groundwater supply being depleted. Whether any of these proposed projects 
will be successful depends largely on whether the state or federal government 
is willing to share in paying the project costs. In any event, there is a greater 
demand for supplemental irrigation water than the Platte River can supply 
even under the most optimistic assumptions (Aiken 1987). Therefore, 
irrigators who do not secure a Platte River water project will look to alterna-
tive water sources, including Sandhills groundwater. Interbasin groundwater 
transfers could become the water source for new irrigation projects if state 
financing for such projects (for example, from a state water use fee) can be 
generated. 
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The LB 146 water transfers study proposes to authorize instate and inter-
tate water transfers with strong mitigation and compensation requirements. ~ith this background, several additional policy alternatives appear worthy of 
consideration. 
Do Nothing. One option is to make no substantial policy changes. In this 
scenario the current surface and groundwater export statutes would be 
retained without major change. Statutory changes that should be considered, 
however, include clarifying that groundwater cannot be exported under a 
municipal or industrial groundwater transfer permit without also obtaining a 
groundwater export permit. 
This policy would provide some protection to Nebraska groundwater 
uses in that the Department of Water Resources director has broad, if 
implicit, discretion under current statutes to tip the scales toward instate 
uses in evaluating proposed water exports. In addition, Nebraska landowners 
would not have the opportunity to sell the groundwater underlying their land 
for export. This approach would reduce current political controversy, defer-
ring it to the future. 
Discourage Exports. A second option would be to discourage exports by 
better defining the public interest criterion in surface and groundwater 
export statutes to include a greater consideration of future instate water 
needs. This could include the possibility of water transfers and higher water 
use charges for exports. Basically, this option would explore the boundaries 
of the limited instate preference of Sporhase. 
Strictly Allocate Groundwater. Nebraska is one of only a few western 
states that does not allocate groundwater similarly to surface water. Given 
approval in the Sporhase decision of strict water conservation measures 
applied across the board, Nebraska could establish strict groundwater alloca-
tions to achieve stated aquifer life objectives. 
A very modest objective would be to require groundwater supplies to last 
at least forty years and to restrict withdrawals and well drilling accordingly. 
This requirement in Colorado forced Mr. Sporhase to corne to Nebraska for 
water to irrigate his Colorado land: that state had already closed his area to 
further drilling to prevent groundwater depletion in less than forty years. In 
some areas where supplies were more abundant or groundwater develop-
ment less widespread, a 100-year minimum useful life might be a more 
appropriate policy objective. This would be more restrictive, but it would 
provide a higher degree of resource protection. To accomplish a perpetual 
useful life - the stated policy of most natural resource districts in Nebraska 
- would require limiting total withdrawals to average annual recharge. This 
restrictive approach would be most feasible in an area such as the Sandhills, 
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where recharge is significant and where irrigation is not as widely develOPed 
as in other regions of Nebraska. 
The effect of these restrictive policies would be to discourage large-scale 
groundwater exports. For example, low volume exports to small communities 
or rural water districts would probably not be affected by strict groundwater 
allocation policies; large exports to Denver, Phoenix or Los Angeles wOuld. 
Local groundwater development would also be restricted, which may be one 
reason this option was not pursued by the Water Management Board in the 
water transfers study. 
Protect Instream Flows. A similar policy could be established for surface 
water through state water reservations or appropriations for instream 
purposes in order to maintain existing streamflows and associated environ_ 
mental values. Such a policy would be favored not only by environmental 
interests, but also by Platte Valley municipalities depending upon Platte 
River recharge of municipal wellfields, such as is the case for Omaha, 
Lincoln, Grand Island and Fremont. 
State Water Leasing. One option worthy of more detailed consideration 
is for Nebraska to appropriate its unappropriated water to the state itself 
and then make that water available for use on a lease basis rather than by 
appropriation. A similar policy has been adopted by Montana, ostensibly to 
insulate the state from the Sporhase decision. The basic theory is that if the 
state is leasing rights to use water rather than allocating water rights, the 
state has entered the market directly rather than regulating market activity 
and therefore is not subject to the interstate commerce clause (Tarlock 
1988). If the state is a market participant rather than a market regulator, the 
state may favor its own citizens in, for example, marketing the state's water. 
This might include charging higher prices for water exports than for instate 
water uses, even prices making exports prohibitively expensive. The market 
participation strategy has not yet been legally tested regarding water exports, 
but it is an option worth further consideration if Nebraska policy makers 
determine the state is better served by using Nebraska water in Nebraska 
rather than by selling it for export. 
Instate Water Use Preferences. The final water exports strategy is to 
build on the implied Sporhase instate preference. The Sporhase decision 
suggests that in states where water is publicly owned, public ownership may 
justify favoring instate use over water exports beyond public health 
considerations. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court did not explain what 
it meant when it said this. Ultimate resolution of this issue will require 
additional litigation of state water export policies, similar to that of El Paso I 
and II, including further litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court. What this 
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inState preference suggests, however, is that states may be free to pursue 
alternatives to favor instate use over water exports, and that this can be done 
through vehicles other than the Nebraska reciprocity clause. 
How might an instate preference be advanced? The easiest way is to 
require positive net benefits to Nebraska from all proposed water appropria-
tioDS, including water exports. If a proposed export would interfere with 
existing water uses, harm environmental values, and provide economic 
benefits only outside Nebraska, the project would have no benefits to 
Nebraska and the state might be justified (under the implied Sporhase instate 
preference) in denying the application. The appropriation criteria could be 
refined to require net benefits in every evaluation category; that is, positive 
net water supply benefits to Nebraska, positive net economic benefits to 
Nebraska, and positive net environmental benefits to Nebraska from any 
proposed appropriation (including exports). If exporters must score posi-
tively on every evaluation criterion, the cost of water exports would be 
increased substantially: new wells would have to be drilled or well owners 
compensated for lowered groundwater tables; streamflow would need to be 
augmented to compensate for stream-depletion effects of groundwater 
pumping; and local governments would need to be compensated for reduced 
property tax receipts if groundwater declines lowered land values. 
The basic policy issue is whether water exports are good or bad for 
Nebraska. LB 146 uncritically concludes that exports are good and should be 
vigorously pursued. The public response to LB 146 suggests that Nebraskans 
States may be free to pursue alternatives to favor instate 
use over water exports, and this can be done through vehicles 
other than the Nebraska reciprocity clause. 
do not share that judgment. If the Sporhase decision means that water 
exports are inevitable, then Nebraska should take some steps to protect its 
legitimate interests. This may include a policy of encouraging water exports 
for the economic benefits of Nebraskans with water to sell. At this point, 
however, it seems premature to conclude that the state's interest is best 
served by aggressively trying to export Nebraska water for sale, the original 
intent ofLB 146 and LB 151. 
Water Right Transfers Policy Alternatives 
The specter of selling water rights raises many of the same fears as selling 
or exporting water. Images come to mind of irrigated land reverting to 
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dryland, rural communities dying, and the state turning to dust. Again, these 
fears are significantly exaggerated. As irrigation consumes approximately 
ninety percent of all water used in the West (and in Nebraska), all nOnirriga_ 
tion uses could be doubled by reducing irrigation only ten percent. Even if 
municipal and industrial water uses expand dramatically, they are not likely 
to double for many years. Thus, making water rights salable will not lead to 
the end of irrigated agriculture in Nebraska. 
The LB 146 water transfers study recommends making water rights freely 
transferable between uses and across river basin and state lines, subject to a 
showing of no injury to existing water rights holders. This would create an 
opportunity for some imaginative water management opportunities in 
Nebraska. For example, if the Two Forks project to impound additiOnal 
Platte River water in Colorado would reduce streamflow into Nebraska, 
harming wildlife species, the Two Forks sponsors could avoid that harm by 
purchasing Nebra'ika surface water rights and converting those rights to 
instream uses. Similarly, if the Wyoming Deer Creek project would reduce 
water availability to downstream Nebraska irrigators, Deer Creek Sponsors 
could purchase Nebraska water rights and either retire them or make them 
available to Nebraska irrigators. Upstream development could still occur, 
and Nebraska water uses would be compensated either with money or with 
water. Wildlife proponents within Nebraska could also buy out existing 
irrigators and convert their rights to instream uses. Making water rights 
salable would add considerable fleXibility to Nebraska water management 
options. 
Against this background, additional policy alternatives include doing 
nothing and making water rights transferable, but only for environmental 
enhancement and water resource mitigation. 
Do Nothing. A possible alternative is to do nothing - to leave existing 
water rights transfer policies intact. This would deprive Nebraska of the 
flexibility afforded by water right transfers, but would largely insulate the 
state from exporting water rights. If water rights could not be sold for use 
outside the river basin or for a different use, there would be virtually no 
economic reason to purchase water rights from within or outside of 
Nebraska. 
Environmental Enhancement and Mitigation Transfers. An inter-
mediate policy would be to allow water rights to be changed to different uses 
only when the purpose was to improve minimum streamflows or to mitigate 
the harm to irrigators of an upstream water project. That is, irrigation water 
rights could not be sold for municipal or industrial uses but could be sold for 
environmental enhancement or mitigation. Thus, surface water rights could 
be purchased and the water left in the stream either to compensate for the 
Selling Nebraska's Water 127 
stream depletion effects of an upstream water project, or simply to improve 
wildlife habitat. This option would allow Nebraska to capture some of the 
flexibility afforded by water rights transfers without completely opening up 
the possibility of interstate water rights transfers for municipal or industrial 
purposes. 
Conclusion 
Water transfer is a difficult, complicated, and controversial topic. Unfor-
tunately, the Sporhase decision will not allow Nebraska policymakers the 
lUXUry of avoiding the issues involved. Policymakers must understand the 
interrelationship of water transfer and its various policy strands with other 
water policy issues, such as groundwater depletion, instream flows, financing 
water development, and the relationship between water development and 
crop surpluses. The Water Management Board's water transfer study and 
proposed bills provide significant issues for political consideration. This 
chapter provides a broader perspective of how these issues relate to larger 
water and natural resource policy concerns. 
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Endnote 
1. An acre-foot of water is enough water to cover an acre of land to a depth of one foot a 
325,851 gal\ons. An acre-foot of water will irrigate approximately one half acre of com or ~i1~ 
supply the domestic needs of a family of four for approximately one year. 
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